Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load
Abstract
This study further examines the failure of game form recognition in preference elicitation (Cason and Plott, 2014) by making elicitation more cognitively demanding through a cognitive load manipulation. We hypothesized that if subjects misperceive one game for another game, then by depleting their cognitive resources, subjects would misconceive the more-cognitively demanding task for the less-cognitively demanding task at a higher rate. We find no evidence that subjects suffer from a first-price-auction game-form misconception, but once cognitive resources are depleted, subjects’ choices are better explained by random choice. More cognitively able subjects are more immune to deviations from sub-optimal play than lower cognitively able subjects. Moreover, we find no support for partial game form recognition. Our results are robust to the integration of risk preferences in the analysis.
Andreas C. Drichoutis
Associate Professor of Consumer Behavior
His research interests are focused on decision making across a broad spectrum of topics pertinent to agricultural/food economics. His contributions are notably diversified spanning the area of contingent valuation and experimental auctions methods, choice under risk, inter-temporal decision making and applied demand analysis. Most of his research applies experimental economics methods to answer questions relevant to agricultural economists and decision scientists.